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Abstract
The paper takes the Abstract Principal Principle to be a norm demanding that subjective degrees
of belief of a Bayesian agent be equal to the objective probabilities once the agent has conditionalized
his subjective degrees of beliefs on the values of the objective probabilities, where the objective
probabilities can be not only chances but any other quantities determined objectively. Weak and
strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle are dened in terms of classical probability
measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent and that
it is strongly consistent in the category of probability measure spaces where the Boolean algebra
representing the objective random events is nite. It is argued that it is desirable to strengthen the
Abstract Principal Principle by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency
of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are dened, and the strong consistency of the
Abstract Principal Principle is interpreted as necessary for a non-omniscient Bayesian agent to be
able to have rational degrees of belief in all epistemic situations. It is shown that the Stable Abstract
Principal Principle is weakly consistent, but the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal
principle remains an open question. We conclude that we do not yet have proof that Bayesian agents
can have rational degrees of belief in every epistemic situation.
1 The claims
The aim of this paper is to investigate the consistency of what we call the \Abstract Principal
Principle". We take the Abstract Principal Principle to be a general norm that regulates probabilities
representing the subjective degrees of beliefs of an abstract Bayesian agent by requiring the agent's
degrees of beliefs to be equal to the objective probabilities if the agent knows the values of the
objective probabilities. We call this principle the Abstract Principal Principle because nothing is
assumed about the specic nature of the objective probabilities | they can be (nite or innite)
relative frequencies, chances, propensities, ratios of some sort, or any other quantities viewed as
determined objectively, i.e. independently of the agent and his beliefs.
After stating the Abstract Principal Principle informally in section 2, we describe in a non-
technical way the consistency problem to be analyzed in the paper. The consistency in question is
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of fundamental nature: it expresses the harmony of the Abstract Principal Principle with the basic
structure of measure theoretic probability theory. It will be seen that this consistency comes in
dierent degrees of strength and we develop them step by step, proceeding from weaker to stronger.
In section 3 we dene formally, in terms of classical measure theoretic probability theory specied
by the standard Kolmogorovian axioms the weak consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle
(Denition 1) and prove that the Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent (Proposition 1).
The proof will reveal a weakness in the concept of weak consistency and in section 4 we will dene the
strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle. We then prove (details of the proof are given
in the Appendix) that, under some (mild) assumptions on the agent's prior subjective probability,
the Abstract Principal Principle is strongly consistent in the category of probability spaces where
the Boolean algebra representing the random events having objective probability has a nite number
of elements (Proposition 2). We will then argue that it is very natural to strengthen the Abstract
Principal Principle by requiring it to satisfy a stability property, which expresses that conditional
degrees of beliefs in events already equal (in the spirit of the Abstract Principal Principle) to the
objective probabilities of the events do not change as a result of conditionalizing them further on
knowing the objective probabilities of other events (in particular of events that are independent with
respect to their objective probabilities). We call this amended principle Stable Abstract Principal
Principle (if stability is required only with respect to further conditionalizing on values of probabilities
of independent events: Independence-Stable Principal Principle). This stability requirement leads to
suitably modied versions of both the weak and strong consistency of the (Independence-)Stable
Abstract Principal Principle (Denitions 4 and 5). We will prove that the Stable Abstract Principal
Principle is weakly consistent (Proposition 3), irrespective of cardinality of the Boolean algebra of
random events. This entails that the Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle also is weakly
consistent (Proposition 4). (Details of the proof are given in the Appendix.)
The strong consistency of both the Stable and of the Independence-Stable Abstract Principal
Principle remain open problems however, even in the category of probability spaces with a nite
Boolean algebra. In section 7 we will interpret the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal
Principle as a necessary condition for a non-omniscient Bayesian agent to be able to have rational
degrees of belief under all epistemic conditions and thus will conclude that we do not yet have proof
that Bayesian agents can in principle always be rational.
Throughout the systematic part of the paper containing the results (sections 2-7) no references
will be given to relevant and related literature. Section 8 puts the results into context. In particular,
we discuss in this section the relevance of the notion of strong consistency of the Stable Abstract
Principal Principle from the perspective of the Principal Principle about chances. The main message
of this section is that the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle also is necessary
for the consistency of both the original formulation of the Principal Principle by Lewis and for the
consistency of some of the subsequent modications of the original Principal Principle that have been
proposed in the literature on the Principal Principle. Since the consistency of the Stable Abstract
Principal Principle is an open problem, it is not known at this point whether the original Principal
Principle and of some of the suggested modications are in harmony with the basic conceptual
structure of measure theoretic probability.
2 The Abstract Principal Principle informally
The Abstract Principal Principle regulates probabilities representing the subjective degrees of beliefs
of an abstract Bayesian agent by stipulating that the subjective degrees of beliefs psubj(A) of the
agent in events A are related to the objective probabilities pobj(A) as
psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) = pobj(A) (1)
where ppobj(A) = rq denotes the proposition \the objective probability, pobj(A), of A is equal to r".
The Abstract Principal Principle { and the formulation given by eq. (1) in particular { presupposes
that both psubj and pobj have the features of a probability measure: they both are assumed to be
additive maps dened on a Boolean algebra taking values in the unit interval [0; 1]: pobj is supposed to
be dened on a Boolean algebra Sobj of random events viewed as specied objectively (equivalently, on
a Boolean algebra of propositions stating that the random events happen); and psubj also is supposed
to be a map with a domain of denition being a Boolean algebra Ssubj .
It is crucial to realize that the Boolean algebras Sobj and Ssubj cannot be unrelated: for the
conditional probability psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) in eq. (1) to be well-dened via the Bayes'rule, it is
necessary that the Boolean algebra Ssubj serving as the domain of denition of the probability measure
psubj contains both the Boolean algebra Sobj of random events and with every random event A also the
proposition ppobj(A) = rq | for if Ssubj does not contain both of these two sorts of propositions then
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the formula psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) cannot be interpreted as an expression of conditional probability
specied by the Bayes'rule because the conditional probability psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) given by the
Bayes'rule reads
psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) = psubj(A \ ppobj(A) = rq)
psubj(ppobj(A) = rq)
(2)
thus all three propositions A, ppobj(A) = rq and A \ ppobj(A) = rq must belong to the Boolean
algebra Ssubj on which the subjective probability psubj is dened.
It is far from obvious however that, given any Boolean algebra Sobj of random events with any
probability measure pobj on Sobj , there exists a Boolean algebra Ssubj meeting these algebraic re-
quirements in such a way that a probability measure psubj satisfying the condition (2) also exists
on Ssubj . If there exists a Boolean algebra Sobj of random events with a probability measure pobj
giving the objective probabilities of events for which there exists no Boolean algebra Ssubj on which a
probability function psubj satisfying (2) can be dened, then the Abstract Principal Principle would
not be maintainable in general { the Abstract Principal Principle would then be inconsistent as a
general norm: In this case the agent, being in the epistemic situation of facing the objective facts
represented by (Sobj ; pobj), cannot have degrees of belief satisfying the Abstract Principal Principle
for fundamental structural reasons inherent in the basic structure of classical probability theory. We
say that the Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent if it is not inconsistent in the sense
described. (The adjective \weakly" will be explained shortly.) To formulate the weak consistency of
the Abstract Principal Principle precisely, we x some notation and recall some denitions rst.
3 Weak consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle
The triplet (X;S; p) denotes a classical probability measure space specied by the Kolmogorovian
axioms, where X is the set of elementary random events, S is a Boolean algebra of (some) subsets of
X representing a general event and p is a probability measure on S. Given two Boolean algebras S
and S 0, the map h : S ! S 0 is a Boolean algebra embedding if it preserves all Boolean operations:
h(A1 [A2) = h(A1) [ h(A2) (3)
h(A1 \A2) = h(A1) \ h(A2) (4)
h(A?) = h(A)? (5)
and is injective:
A 6= B entails h(A) 6= h(B) (6)
If h : S ! S 0 is a Boolean algebra embedding, then h(S) is an isomorphic copy of S, which can be
viewed as a Boolean subalgebra of S 0. From the perspective of probability theory elements A and
h(A) can be regarded as identical A$ h(A).
The probability space (X 0;S 0; p0) is called an extension of the probability space (X;S; p) with
respect to h if h is a Boolean algebra embedding of S into S 0 that preserves the probability measure
p:
p0(h(A)) = p(A) A 2 S (7)
Denition 1. The Abstract Principal Principle is dened to be weakly consistent if the following hold:
Given any probability space (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj), there exists a probability space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) and
a Boolean algebra embedding h of Sobj into Ssubj such that
(i) For every A 2 Sobj there exists an A0 2 Ssubj with the property
psubj(h(A)jA0) = pobj(A) (8)
(ii) If A;B 2 Sobj and A 6= B then A0 6= B0.
The intuitive content of Denition 1 should now be clear: The probability space (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj)
describes the objective probabilities; in particular pobj(A) is the probability of the random event
A 2 Sobj . The Boolean algebra Ssubj in the probability space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) contains not only
the \copies" h(A) of all the random events A 2 Sobj (together with all the undistorted algebraic
relations among the random events), but, with every random event A 2 Sobj , also an element A0
to be interpreted as representing the proposition \the objective probability, pobj(A), of A is equal
to r" (this proposition we denoted by ppobj(A) = rq). If A 6= B then A0 6= B0 must be the case
because ppobj(A) = rq and ppobj(B) = sq are dierent propositions { this is expressed by (ii) in the
denition. The main content of the Abstract Principal Principle is then expressed by condition (8),
which states that the conditional degrees of beliefs psubj(h(A)jA0) of an agent about random events
h(A) $ A 2 Sobj are equal to the objective probabilities pobj(A) of the random events, where the
condition A0 is that the agent knows the values of the objective probabilities.
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Proposition 1. The Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent.
The above proposition follows from the proposition that states the weak consistency of the Stable
Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 3), which we state later and prove in the Appendix. To
motivate the need to strengthen the notion of weak consistency, we give here a proof of Proposition 1
under the simplifying restriction that the Boolean algebra Sobj has a nite number of elements. The
proof will expose the conceptual weakness of the notion of weak consistency; recognizing the weakness
leads naturally to the notion of strong consistency.
Let (XobjSobj ; pobj) be a probability space and assume that Sobj is a nite Boolean algebra having
n < 1 elements. Let Xn be any set having n elements and f : Sobj ! Xn be a bijection. Let p be
any probability measure on the power set P(Xn) of Xn such that p(A) 6= 0 for any ; 6= A 2 P(Xn).
Consider the standard product probability space
(Xobj Xn;Sobj 
 P(Xn); pobj  p) (9)
of the probability spaces (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj) and (Xn;P(Xn); p), where pobj  p is the product measure
on Sobj 
 P(Xn). Recall that the Boolean algebra Sobj 
 P(Xn) is the smallest Boolean algebra on
Xobj Xn that contains all the sets of the form A  B with A 2 Sobj , B 2 P(Xn); and for A  B,
with A 2 Sobj and B 2 P(Xn) we have
(pobj  p)(AB) = pobj(A)p(B) (10)
The maps h and g dened by
Sobj 3 A 7! h(A) := (AXn) 2 Sobj 
 P(Xn) (11)
P(Xn) 3 B 7! g(B) := (Xobj B) 2 Sobj 
 P(Xn) (12)
are Boolean algebra embeddings and psubj
:
= (pobj  p) is a probability function that satises eq. (8)
with
A0 = Xobj  ff(A)g (13)
because
psubj(h(A)jA0) = psubj((AXn) \ (Xobj  ff(A)g)
psubj(Xobj  ff(A)g) =
(pobj  p)(A ff(A)g)
(pobj  p)(Xobj  ff(A)g) (14)
=
pobj(A)p(ff(A)g)
pobj(Xobj)p(ff(A)g) = pobj(A) (15)
In short, given (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj), the product probability space (9) satises the conditions required
of (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) by the denition of weak consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle,
and the reason for this is that the restriction of the probability measure psubj = (pobj  p) to the
(isomorphic copy h(Sobj) of) Boolean algebra Sobj of random events coincides with the probability
measure pobj giving the objective probability of the random events, and, as the calculation (14)
shows, conditionalizing with respect to the propositions A0 = Xobj  ff(A)g (which are interpreted
as stating the values of objective probabilities) does not change psubj(A) because the propositions A
0
and A $ h(A) = (A Xn), in virtue of their lying in dierent components of the product Boolean
algebra, are independent with respect to the product measure psubj = (pobj  p) on the product
algebra. That is to say, in the situation represented by this product state case, the agent's degrees
of beliefs psubj(A) are equal to the objective probabilities pobj(A) without any conditionalizing, and
conditionalizing them on the independent propositions stating the values of the objective probabilities
does not change the already correct degrees of belief. Clearly, this is a very exceptional situation
however, and it is more realistic to assume that the agent's degrees of belief are only equal to the
objective probabilities after conditionalizing them on knowing the values of objective probabilities
but not before. One would like to know if the Abstract Principal Principle is possible to maintain
(is consistent) under these more realistic circumstances. The denition of weak consistency does not
say anything about this more stringent consistency however; thus it is desirable to strengthen it in
the manner specied in the next section.
4 Strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle
Denition 2. The Abstract Principal Principle is dened to be strongly consistent if the following
hold: Given any probability space (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj) and another probability measure p0subj on Sobj ,
there exists a probability space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) and a Boolean algebra embedding h of Sobj into
Ssubj such that
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(i) For every A 2 Sobj there exists an A0 2 Ssubj with the property
psubj(h(A)jA0) = pobj(A) (16)
(ii) If A;B 2 Sobj and A 6= B then A0 6= B0.
(iii) The probability space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) is an extension of the probability space
(Xobj ;Sobj ; p0subj) with respect to h; i.e. we have
psubj(h(A)) = p
0
subj(A) A 2 Sobj (17)
The above Denition 2 diers from the denition of weak consistency (Denition 1) only by
the additional requirement (iii). The intuitive content of this requirement is that the agent's prior
probability function psubj restricted to the random events can be equal to an arbitrarily chosen
measure p0subj on Sobj ; in particular the agent's prior subjective probabilities about random events
can dier from the objective probabilities of the random events given by pobj .
Denition 3. An agent's prior degrees of beliefs represented by p0subj are called non-extreme (with
respect to the objective probability function pobj) if they satisfy the two conditions below:
 The agent's prior probabilities are not zero in events that have non-zero objective probability:
p0subj(A) = 0 entails pobj(A) = 0
 The agent's prior probabilities are not equal to 1 in events whose non-occurrence have a nonzero
objective probability:
p0subj(A) = 1 entails pobj(A) = 1
Proposition 2. The Abstract Principal Principle is strongly consistent in the category of probability
spaces with a nite Boolean algebra under the further assumption that the agent's prior degrees of
beliefs are not extreme.
We prove the above proposition in the Appendix. The proof is based on a technique that con-
structs, in nite steps, an extension of a probability space with a nite Boolean algebra; the extension
itself will be a probability space in which the Boolean algebra has a nite number of elements. The
extension procedure diers from taking the standard product of the probability measure space to be
extended with a suitable chosen other one, which was the technique used to prove the weak consis-
tency of the Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 1), and which also is the technique we will use
to prove the weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle later. We conjecture that
the strong consistency cannot be proved by taking the standard product as an extension; furthermore
we conjecture that Proposition 2 holds generally:
Conjecture 1. Proposition 2 is true without the assumption that the Boolean algebra of random
events is nite.1
5 Strengthening the Abstract Principal Principle: The
Stable Abstract Principal Principle
Once the agent has learned the values of the objective probabilities and has adjusted his subjective de-
grees of belief by conditionalizing on this evidence, psubj(h(A)jppobj(A) = rq) = r, he can in principle
conditionalize again his already conditionalized degrees of belief; he can in particular conditionalize
on the evidence of values of objective probabilities of events dierent from A: on ppobj(B) = sq, say.
What should be the result of this second conditionalization? Since the agent's conditional degrees
of belief psubj(h(A)jppobj(A) = rq) in A are already correct, i.e. equal to the objective probabilities,
learning an additional truth, namely the value of the objective probability pobj(B), it would be an
irrational move on the agents's part to change his already correct degree of belief about A. That
is to say, a rational agent's conditional subjective degrees of belief should be stable in the sense of
satisfying the following condition:
psubj
 
h(A)jppobj(A) = rq

= psubj
 
h(A)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq

(8B 2 Sobj) (18)
Another reason why stability should be a feature of the conditional subjective degrees of belief is the
following. If A and B are independent with respect to their objective probabilities pobj(A \ B) =
1See the paper [4].
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pobj(A)pobj(B), then if the conditional subjective degrees of belief are stable in the sense of (18), then
(assuming the Abstract Principal Principle) one has
psubj(h(A) \ h(B)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq \ ppobj(A \B) = tq) (19)
= psubj(h(A \B)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq \ ppobj(A \B) = tq)
= psubj(h(A \B)jppobj(A \B) = tq)
= pobj(A \B)
= pobj(A)pobj(B)
= psubj(h(A)jppobj(A) = rq)psubj(h(B)jppobj(B) = sq)
= psubj(h(A)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq \ ppobj(A \B) = tq) (20)
psubj(h(B)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq \ ppobj(A \B) = tq) (21)
Equations (19) and (20)-(21) mean that if the conditional subjective degrees of belief are stable,
then, if A and B are objectively independent, then they (their isomorphic images h(A); h(B)) are
also subjectively independent: they are independent also with respect to the probability measure
that represents conditional subjective degrees of belief, where the condition is that the agent knows
the objective probabilities of all of A, B and (A \ B). In other words, in this case the conditional
subjective degrees of beliefs properly reect the objective independence relations of random events
{ they are independence-faithful. To put this negatively: if a subjective probability measure sat-
isfying the Abstract Principal Principle is not stable, then, although the agent's degrees of belief
are equal to the objective probabilities of individual random events after a single conditionalization
on the values of the objective probabilities of these individual events, these (unstable) individually
conditionalized subjective probability measures do not necessarily reect the objective independence
relations between the random events { stable conditionalized subjective probabilities reect the ob-
jective probabilities more faithfully than unstable ones. Note that for the subjective degrees of belief
to satisfy the independence-faithfulness condition expressed by eqs. (19) and (20)-(21), it is sucient
that stability (18) only holds for the restricted set of elements B in the Boolean subalgebra SA;indobj
of Sobj generated by the elements in Sobj that are independent of A with respect to pobj .
All this motivates to amend the Abstract Principal Principle by requiring stability of the subjective
probabilities and dene a \Stable Abstract Principal Principle":
Stable Abstract Principal Principle The subjective probabilities psubj(A) are related to the
objective probabilities pobj(A) as
psubj(Ajppobj(A) = rq) = pobj(A) (22)
Furthermore, the subjective probability function is stable in the sense that the following holds:
psubj
 
h(A)jppobj(A) = rq

= psubj
 
h(A)jppobj(A) = rq \ ppobj(B) = sq

(8B 2 S) (23)
If the subjective probability function is only independence-stable in the sense that (23) above holds for
all B 2 SA;indobj , then the corresponding Stable Abstract Principal Principle is called the Independence-
Stable Abstract Principal Principle.
The next section raises the problem of the consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle.
6 Is the Stable Abstract Principal Principle strongly con-
sistent?
Denition 4. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is dened to be weakly consistent if it is
weakly consistent in the sense of Denition 1 and the subjective probability function psubj is stable:
it satises condition (23). The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle is dened to be
weakly consistent if it is weakly consistent in the sense of Denition 1 and the subjective probability
function psubj is independence-stable: it satises (23) for all B 2 SA;indobj .
Thus the problem of weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle emerges, and we
have
Proposition 3. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent.
The above proposition entails in particular
Proposition 4. The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent.
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We prove Proposition 3 in the Appendix. The proof is based on the product extension technique
that was used to show the weak consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle in the category of
probability spaces with a nite Boolean algebra, and so the proof reveals the same weakness of the
notion of weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle that we pointed out earlier
in connection with the Abstract Principal Principle: In the situation represented by the product
extension case, the agent's degrees of beliefs psubj(A) are equal to the objective probabilities pobj(A)
without any conditionalizing, and conditionalizing them on the independent propositions stating the
values of the objective probabilities does not change the already correct degrees of belief. Clearly, this
is a very exceptional situation however, and it is more realistic to assume that the agent's degrees
of belief are only equal to the objective probabilities after conditionalizing them on knowing the
values of objective probabilities but not before. One would like to know if the (Independence-)Stable
Abstract Principal Principle is consistent under these more realistic circumstances. The denition
of weak consistency of the (Independence-)Stable Abstract Principal Principle does not say anything
about this more stringent consistency however; thus it is desirable to strengthen it in the manner
specied in the next denition.
Denition 5. The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is dened to be strongly consistent if it is
strongly consistent in the sense of Denition 2 and the subjective probability function psubj is stable.
Explicitly:
The Stable Abstract Principal Principle is strongly consistent if the following hold: Given any proba-
bility space (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj) and another probability measure p0subj on Sobj , there exists a probability
space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) and a Boolean algebra embedding h of Sobj into Ssubj such that
(i) For every A 2 Sobj there exists an A0 2 Ssubj with the property
psubj(h(A)jA0) = pobj(A) (24)
(ii) If A;B 2 Sobj and A 6= B then A0 6= B0.
(iii) The probability space (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) is an extension of the probability space
(Xobj ;Sobj ; p0subj) with respect to h; i.e. we have
psubj(h(A)) = p
0
subj(A) A 2 Sobj (25)
(iv) For all B 2 S we have
psubj(h(A)jA0) = psubj
 
h(A)jA0 \B0) (26)
The Independence-Stable Abstract Principal principle is strongly consistent if (i)-(iii) above holds,
and instead of (iv), we have
(iv')
psubj(h(A)jA0) = psubj
 
h(A)jA0 \B0) 8B 2 SA;indobj (27)
Problem 1. Is the (Independence-)Stable Abstract Principal Principle strongly consistent?
The problem of strong consistency of both the Stable and of the Independence-Stable Abstract
Principal Principle remain open, even in the category of probability spaces with a Boolean algebra
having a nite number of elements: An explicit counterexample detailed in the Appendix (Proposition
7) shows that the method used in proving the strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle
does not prove the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle. Specically, one can
show by an explicit calculation that if a Bayesian agent is in the very simple epistemic situation of
having to form degrees of beliefs about the two events occurring in coin ipping, which is described
by the simplest non-trivial Boolean algebra S4obj formed by the four events f;; A(Head); A?(Tail); Ig
with objective probabilities pobj(A) =
1
5
and pobj(A
?) = 4
5
, then, if a Bayesian agent's prior subjective
degrees of beliefs are p0subj(A) =
1
3
and p0subj(A
?) = 2
3
, then the subjective degree of belief psubj on
the Boolean algebra Ssubj constructed using the method in the proof of Proposition 2 will not be
stable. Note that we do not claim, that in such an epistemic situation it is not possible for the
Bayesian agent to form a Ssubj and extend p0subj to Ssubj in such a way that the Abstract Principal
Principle holds for psubj possibly together with stability. We only claim that it is not possible to
do this in the particular way that proves in general the strong consistency of the Abstract Principal
Principle; hence the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle remains an open
problem.
In the next two sections we argue that proving either that the (Independence-)Stable Principal
Principle is strongly consistent or that the strong consistency does not hold has ramications both
for the original Principal Principle and for Bayesianism in general.
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7 Can Bayesian agents always be rational?
Call a Bayesian agent omniscient if he never has to adjust his subjective degrees of belief because
his prior degrees of belief about random events in Sobj coincide with the objective probabilities pobj
on Sobj in all epistemic situations without any conditionalization: no matter what the set of random
events Sobj and their objective probabilities pobj are, facing (Sobj ; pobj), the agent has prior degrees
of belief p0subj on Sobj such that
p0subj(A) = pobj(A) A 2 Sobj (28)
The weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle shows that such an omniscient agent
can always be a rational Bayesian agent in the sense that (i) he can always form a logically well-
behaving set of propositions which is closed with respect to Boolean operations and which contains
both the propositions stating that events in S happen and the propositions about the values of their
objective probability; furthermore (ii) he can always have consistent degrees of belief as probabilities
about all these propositions in such a way that (iii) if he conditionalizes his already correct prior
degrees of belief on the values of any of the objective probabilities, his correct degrees of belief do
not change. In short: weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle ensures that an
omniscient Bayesian agent can in principle be always rational.
We regard the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle necessary for a non-
omniscient (hence more realistic) Bayesian agent to be able to have rational degrees of belief in all
epistemic situations. For if the strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle does
not hold, then there exist in principle epistemic situations the Bayesian agent can nd himself in, in
which at least one of the following (i)-(iii) cannot be maintained:
(i) Degrees of beliefs of the agent are represented by probability measures satisfying the usual
axioms of measure theoretic probability.
(ii) The agent's prior degrees of beliefs dier from the objective probabilities but by learning the
correct objective probabilities the agent can adjust his degrees of beliefs using Bayesian condi-
tionalization so that they become equal to the objective probabilities.
(iii) The adjusted degrees of beliefs are stable: by learning additional truths about objective proba-
bilities and re-conditionalizing his correct degrees of belief on them, the agent is not loosing his
already correct degrees of belief.
If not even the Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Principle can be proved to be strongly con-
sistent, then (iii) above can be replaced with
(iii') The adjusted degrees of beliefs are stable: by learning additional truths about objective proba-
bilities of objectively independent events and re-conditionalizing his correct degrees of belief on
them, the agent is not loosing his already correct degrees of belief (which also entails that the
agent's conditioned degrees of belief reect the objective independence properties of random
events).
Since strong consistency of both the Stable and of the Independence-Stable Abstract Principal Princi-
ple remain open problems, we have to conclude that at this point we do not know for certain whether
non-omniscient Bayesian agents can always be rational in principle.
8 Comments on the Principal Principle involving chances
The idea of the Abstract Principal Principle can be traced back to Reichenbach's \Straight Rule"
of induction connecting subjective and objective probabilities (the paper [3] gives a comprehensive
review of Reichenbach's inductive logic and the role of the straight rule in it). The rst claim about a
possible inconsistency of the Straight Rule seems to be Miller's Paradox [13]; since Miller's work, the
Straight Rule in the form of equation (1) is also called \Miller's Principle" and \Minimal Principle"
[17], [14]. The inconsistency claim by Miller did not have anything to do with the type of consistency
investigated in the present paper and Miller's Paradox was shown to be a pseudo-paradox resulting
from the ambiguity of the formulation of the Straight Rule [12], [2], [7].
Lewis [9] introduced the term \Principal Principle" to refer to the specic principle that links
subjective beliefs to chances in the manner expressed by (1): In the context of the Principal Principle
psubj(A) is called the \credence", Crt(A), of the agent in event A at time t, pobj(A) is the chance
Cht(A) of the event A at time t, and the Principal Principle is the stipulation that credences and
chances are related as
Crt(AjpCht(A) = rq & E) = Cht(A) = r (29)
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where E is any admissible evidence the agent has at time t in addition to knowing the value of the
chance of A.
Lewis himself saw a consistency problem in connection with the Principal Principle (he called it
the \Big Bad Bug"): If A is an event in the future of t that has a non-zero chance r > 0 of happening
at that later time but we have knowledge E about the future that entails that A will in fact not
happen, E  A?, then substituting this E into (29) leads to contradiction if r > 0. Such an A is
called an \unactualized future that undermines present chances" { hence the phrase \undermining"
to refer to this situation. Since certain metaphysically motivated arguments based on a Humean
understanding of chance led Lewis to think that one is forced to admit such an evidence E, he tried
to \debug" the Principal Principle [10]; the same sort of debugging was proposed simultaneously by
Hall [5] and Thau [16]. A number of other debugging attempts and modications have followed [11],
[6], [8], [15], and to date no consensus has emerged as to which of the debugged versions of Lewis
original Principal Principle is tenable: Vranas claims [17] that there was no need for a debugging in
the rst place; Briggs [1] argues that none of the modied principles work; Pettigrew [14] provides a
systematic framework that allows in principle to choose the correct Principal Principle depending on
one's metaphysical concept of chance.
The relevance of the strong consistency of the (Independence-)Stable Abstract Principal Principle
for the original Principal Principle and its debugged versions should now be clear: If admissibility of
evidence E is dened in such a way that E propositions about the values of chances of events are
admitted, then the consistency of the corresponding Principal Principle becomes an open question
because the problem of strong consistency of the (Independence-)Stable Abstract Principal Princi-
ple is open. Allowing this kind of evidence seems common: Lewis himself regarded admissible all
propositions containing information that is \irrelevant" for the chance of A [9][p. 91], these should
include propositions about values of chances of events that are independent of A with respect to the
probability measure describing their chances. Ismael's New Proposal admits any proposition about
events in the backward light cone (causal past) of event A as admissible evidence [8][p. 296]; pre-
sumably propositions about chances of these events belong to the admissible class. Hoefer's informal
specication of admissibility [6][p. 553] also seems to admit propositions stating values of chances
of events as admissible evidence. Consequently, the consistency of all these Principal Principles is
an open question. This kind of consistency has nothing to do with any metaphysics about chances
or with the concept of natural laws that one may have in the background of the Principal Principle:
This consistency expresses a simple but fundamental compatibility of the Principal Principle with
the basic structure of probability theory. Without proving this consistency it is not clear whether
the Principal Principle can be formulated at all meaningfully in terms of probability theory involving
the Bayes rule.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of weak consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Prin-
ciple (Proposition 3)
The statement of weak consistency of the Stable Principal Principle follows from Proposition 5 below
if we make the following identications:
 (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj) $ (X;S; p)
 (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) $ (X 0;S 0; p0)
Proposition 5. Let (X;S; p) be a probability space. Then there exists an extension (X 0;S 0; p0) of
(X;S; p) with respect to a Boolean algebra homomorphism h : S ! S 0 such that
(i) For all A 2 S there is A0 2 S 0 such that
p0
 
h(A)jA0 = p(A)
(ii) A 6= B implies A0 6= B0
(iii)
p0(h(A)jA0) = p0 h(A)jA0 \B0 (8B0 2 S) (30)
Proof. Let (X;S; p) be a probability space and Y0 be a set disjoint from S and having the same
cardinality as the cardinality of S. We can think of Y0 as having elements yA labeled by elements
A 2 S. Consider the set
Y
:
= Y0 [ fyg = fyA : A 2 Sg [ fyg
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where y is an auxiliary element dierent from every yA. Take the powerset P(Y ) and let q be any
probability measure on P(Y ) such that q(fyg) 6= 0. Then (Y;P(Y ); q) is a probability space and we
can form the product space
(X 0;S 0; p0) = (X  Y;S 
 P(Y ); p q)
with p0 = (p q) being the product measure on S 
 P(Y ). Recall that by denition of the product
measure, for sets of the form AB (A 2 S, B 2 P(Y )) we have
p0(AB) = p(A)q(B)
The map h : S ! S 0 dened by h(A) := A  Y is an injective, measure preserving Boolean algebra
embedding. For each A 2 S put
A0 := X  fyA; yg
It is clear that (ii) in the proposition holds for A0; B0 so dened.
To see (i) one can compute:
p0(h(A)jA0) = p
0(h(A) \A0)
p0(A0)
=
p0
 
(A Y ) \ (X  fyA; yg)

p0(X  fyA; yg)
=
p0
 
A fyA; yg

p0
 
X  fyA; yg
 = p(A)  q(fyA; yg)
p(X)  q(fyA; yg) = p(A)
Condition (iii) also holds because
p0(h(A)jA0 \B0) = p
0(h(A) \A0 \B0)
p0(A0 \B0) =
p0
 
(A Y ) \ (X  fyA; yg) \ (X  fyB ; yg)

p0((X  fyA; yg) \ (X  fyB ; yg))
=
p0
 
A fyg
p0
 
X  fyg = p(A)  q(fyg)p(X)  q(fyg) = p(A)
9.2 Proof of strong consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle
in the category of probability spaces with a nite Boolean algebra
(Proposition 2)
The statement of strong consistency of the Stable Principal Principle in the category of probability
spaces follows from Proposition 6 below if we make the following identications:
 (Xobj ;Sobj ; pobj) $ (X;S; p^)
 (Xobj ;Sobj ; p0subj) $ (X;S; p)
 (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) $ (X 0;S 0; p0)
Proposition 6. Let (X;S; p) be a probability space with S having n <1 elements and let p^ be another
probability measure on S such that p is non-extreme with respect to p^ (Denition 3): p(A) = 1 implies
p^(A) = 1 and p(A) = 0 implies p^(A) = 0. Then there exists an extension (X 0;S 0; p0) of (X;S; p) with
respect to the embedding h : S ! S 0 having the following properties:
(i) For all A 2 S there is A0 2 S 0 such that
p0
 
h(A)jA0 = p^(A)
(ii) A 6= B implies A0 6= B0
Proof. The proof consist of two steps. In the rst step we choose an arbitrary element A 2 S and
construct an extension of (X;S; p) with respect to an embedding h in such a manner that in
this extension this particular event A has a pair A0 = A with the required properties. In step 2 we
then repeat this step n  1 times, choosing each time another element from S until we exhaust S and
obtain the extension (X 0;S 0; p0) of (X;S; p).
STEP 1. Take any A 2 S. We wish to construct a space (X;S; p) and a function h : S ! S
such that
 h : (S; p)! (S; p) is a measure preserving, injective Boolean algebra homomorphism.
 There is A 2 S such that p h(A)jA = p^(A).
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Take two disjoint copies of (X;S), let these copies be (X1;S1) and (X2;S2) and x the algebra
isomorphisms h1 : (X;S)! (X1;S1) and h2 : (X;S)! (X;S2). Put X = X1 [X2 and dene
S = h1(A) [ h2(B) : A;B 2 S	 (31)
It is a routine task to verify that (X;S) is a measurable space, i.e. S is a Boolean algebra of subsets
of X with respect to the usual set theoretical operations [, \, ?. Dene the map h : S ! S as
follows
h(A) = h1(A) [ h2(A) A 2 S (32)
We claim that h is a homomorphism between S and S. Indeed: take any A;B 2 S and observe
that
h(A [B) = h1(A [B) [ h2(A [B) = h1(A) [ h1(B) [ h2(A) [ h2(B) = h(A) [ h(B)
h(X nA) = h1(X nA) [ h2(X nA) =
 
X1 n h1(A)
 [  X2 n h2(A) =
= (X1 [X2) n (h1(A) [ h2(A)) = X n h(A)
Let 0    1 be any real number and dene p by
p
 
h1(A) [ h2(B)
 :
=   p(A) + (1  )  p(B) (33)
Note that for each A 2 S we have, by denition
p
 
h(A)

=   p(A) + (1  )  p(A) = p(A) (34)
Consequently, h : (S; p) ! (S; p) is a measure preserving, injective Boolean algebra homomor-
phism.
For any xed A 2 S dene A by
A := h1(A) [ h2(A?) (35)
Our aim now is to choose  in such a way that the following is true:
p(h(A)jA) = p^(A) (36)
Some basic algebra shows that
p(h(A)jA) = p
(h(A) \A)
p(A)
=
p
  
h1(A) [ h2(A)
 \  h1(A) [ h2(A?)
p(h1(A) [ h2(A?))
=
p(h1(A) [ ;)
p(h1(A) [ h2(A?))
=
  p(A) + (1  )  p(;)
  p(A) + (1  )  p(A?)
=
  p(A)
  p(A) + (1  )  (1  p(A))
This means that we have to carefully choose  to guarantee
  p(A)
  p(A) + (1  )  (1  p(A)) = p^(A) (37)
By our assumptions, if p(A) = 1 then p^(A) = 1 and thus any  6= 0 makes (37) true. Similarly, if
p(A) = 0, then p^(A) = 0, which means that any  6= 1 will do. Also, if p^(A) = 0, then  = 0 will do.
Therefore we may assume 0 < p(A) < 1 and 0 < p^(A)  1. By re-ordering equation (37) and using
the notation p = p(A), r = p^(A) we obtain the equation
 =
rp  r
rp  r + pr   p (38)
In order to guarantee (37) we only have to show that  in equation (38) is between 0 and 1. To do
so, observe that since 0 < p < 1 and 0 < r  1 we have rp < r and pr  p. This means that both
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the numerator and the denominator of the fraction in (38) is negative, whence  is positive. On the
other hand, we have
0  pr   p
rp  r  rp  r + pr   p
rp  r
rp  r + pr   p  1
Thus we proved that 0    1 can always be chosen so that equation (36) holds.
STEP 2. We obtain (X 0;S 0; p0) by iterating Step 1. above. Let A1; : : : ; An be a one-to-one enu-
meration of S. Applying step one to A1 one nds a space (X1;S1; p1), an event A1 2 S1 and an
embedding h1
(X;S; p) h1 ! (X1;S1; p1);
such that p1
 
h1(A1)jA1

= p^(A1). In a similar manner, step one applied to h1(A2) gives a space
(X2;S2; p2), an element A2 2 S2 and an embedding h2
(X;S; p) h1 ! (X1;S1; p1) h2 ! (X2;S2; p2)
so that p2
 
h2h1(A2)jA2

= p^(A2). Now, one has to verify that the second extension does not destroy
the result of the rst one, that is to say, p2
 
h2h1(A1)jh2(A1)

should remain equal to p^(A1). But as
h2 is an embedding, it preserves measure, thus it preserves conditional measure as well, meaning that
p2
 
h2h1(A1)jh2(A1)

= p1
 
h1(A1)jA1

= p^(A1):
Continuing in this line, after n steps we get elements Ai 2 Si and a chain of extensions
(X;S; p) h1 ! (X1;S1; p1) h2 ! (X2;S2; p2)!    hn ! (Xn;Sn; pn)
such that
pn
 
hn   h2h1(Ai)jhn   hi+1(Ai )

= p^(Ai)
holds for all Ai. Therefore we can complete the proof by letting
(X 0;S 0; p0) = (Xn;Sn; pn)
h = hnhn 1   h1
A0i = hn   hi+1(Ai )
(where hn+1 is the identity, of course).
Proposition 7. There exists a probability space (X;S; p^) and a probability measure p on S such that
the probability measure p0 in the probability space (X 0;S 0; p0) constructed in the proof of Proposition
2 will not be stable, i.e. for some A;B 2 S we have:
p0(h(A)jA0) 6= p0(h(A)jA0 \B0) (39)
Recall (see the statement of Proposition 2) that (X;S; p^) is the probability space describing the
objective random events and their probabilities, (X 0;S 0; p0) stand for (Xsubj ;Ssubj ; psubj) with p0
being the extension of the agent's prior probability p on S.
Proof. Let S = S4 be the Boolean algebra having four elements f;; A;B; Ig (clearly: B = A?) and let
p^ be a probability measure on S4. Assume that the probability p is p(A) = x and p(B) = p(A?) = 1 x
for some real number x 2 [0; 1]. Since S4 has only two non-trivial elements, constructing the space
(X 0;S 0; p0) that extends (X;S; p) in the way detailed in the proof of Proposition 6 is carried out in two
steps: First one constructs (S; p) with the Boolean algebra homomorphism h : S ! S in such a
way that equations (33), (34), (36) and (37) hold with a suitable . In the second step one constructs
the extension (S; p) of (S; p) with the Boolean algebra homomorphism h : S ! S in such
a way that the analogues of equations (33), (34), (36) and (37) hold, now replacing A with h(B)
and  with a suitable . Following the notation in the proof of Proposition 6, and in particular eq.
(35), we can write:
h = h  h (40)
A0 = h(A) (41)
B0 =
 
h(B)

(42)
12
the equations expressing the Abstract Principal Principle in connection with events A and B are
p0
 
h(A)jA0 = x
x+ (1  )(1  x) (43)
p0
 
h(B)jB0 = (1  x)
(1  x) + (1  )x (44)
One can now compute explicitly the subjective probability p0
 
h(A)jA0\B0 of h(A) in the probability
space (X 0;S 0; p0) after a second conditionalization on the value of the objective probability probability
of B. The computation yields
p0
 
h(A)jA0 \B0 = (1  )x
(1  )(1  x) + (1  )x (45)
Note that since p(h(A)jA0) = p^(A) and p0(h(B)jB0) = p^(B) = p^(A?), we have
p(h(A)jA0) + p(h(B)jB0) = 1 (46)
hence if we take x =  = 1
3
, then we get
p(h(A)jA0) = 1
5
p(h(B)jB0) = 4
5
=)  = 2
3
p(h(A)jA0 \B0) = 1
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Therefore p(h(A)jA0) 6= p(h(A)jA0 \B0).
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